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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

By pleading guilty in the justice court and not moving to

withdraw their pleas, did appellees waive their rights to a trial
de novo in district court or does Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12) allow a
trial de novo regardless of what happened in justice court?
Standard of Review: The standard for review for questions of
law is correctness.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).

Citation to Record where Preserved:
2.

See tr. p. 3.

Does Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) allow the State to appeal

the district

court's dismissal

of its case or is the State

precluded, by Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12), from appealing the district
court's order of dismissal?
(a)

Does it matter, in determining if the rights of appeal of

both parties have been exhausted, that appellees rather than
the State appealed to district court?
(b)

Even though appellees have exhausted their rights of

appeal (from justice court to district court), has the Sate
exhausted any right it may have to appeal the district court's
order which it has not previously appealed?

1

(c)

Does the fact that the State originally brought the case

in justice

court, rather than district

court, impact

its

ability to appeal the district court's decision?
Standard of Review:
law is correctness.

The standard for review for questions of

Pena, at 936.

Citation to Record where Preserved:
3.

If

the State may

appeal

See tr. p. 3.

the trial

court's

order of

dismissal, was it appropriate, under the circumstances, for the
district court to have dismissed the State's case for failing to
respond to appellees' discovery requests?
Standard of Review:

The standard for review for a judge's

decisions regarding discovery is an abuse of discretion.

State v.

Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 882 (Utah 1988), State v. Knill, 656 P.2d
1026, 1027 (Utah 1982) .
Citation to Record where Preserved:

See tr. p. 3.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-2 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-l (1995, Supp. 1997)
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1996)
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120 (1996, Supp. 1997)
Utah R. Crim. P. 16
Utah R. Crim. P. 26
Utah R. Crim. P. 30
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants' cases began in the Dutch John Precinct Court in
Daggett County State of Utah. On or about September 25, 1996, the
Defendants' cases were set for arraignment and fingerprinting. (R.
at 2.)

At that hearing the Defendants plead guilty to the charges

contained

in

the

citations,

being

possession

of

possession of paraphernalia, and open container.
Cynthia and R. at 5 for David.)

marijuana,

(R. at 4 for

On or about October 18, 1996, the

Defendants filed Notices of Appeal with the Justice Court.

(R. at

9 for Cynthia and R. at 10-11 for David.)

On or about October 28,

1996,

in

the

Plaintiff

filed

Memorandums

Defendants' Appeals with the Justice Court.
Cynthia and R. at 12-14 for David.)

Opposition

to

the

(R. at 10-12 for

This matter was then set for

Arraignment/Appeal with the District Court on March 28, 1997.
at 14-15 for Cynthia and R. at 15-16 for David.)

(R.

On or about

March 25, 1997, counsel for the Defendants filed an "Appearance of
Counsel Entry of Not Guilty Plea Demand for Jury Trial", "Request
for Discovery", and "Request for Bill of Particulars" for each of
the defendants.
David.)

(R. at 16-26 for Cynthia and R. at 17-28 for

This matter was then set for Pre-Trial on June 6, 1997.

(R. at 27-28 for Cynthia and R. at 29-30 for David.)

At pretrial

the court and the parties addressed the issue of the appeals from
Justice Court.

(Tr. at 2-4.)

The Plaintiff had filed memorandums
3

LII i.([ pusif: ion t«; t;hr- .appeals.

12-14 for David.)

u

-

luj motions allowing each

The court ru •

Defendant to have a trial de novo.

0-12 f o r C y n t h i a a n d R. at

(Tr. at 2-4.)

The defendants'

attorney then raised rhe issue of discovery that had been requested
but had not yet been received.

(Tr. at 2-4.)

Defendants'' counsel

then requested that this matter be dismissed.

(Tr. at 2-4 ) When

questioned by ' h.n 'purr , the defendants' attorney stated that he
made no calls or letters requesting discovery.

(Tr. at 3.)

The

Plaintiff addressed the court and opposed the motion to dismiss.
(Tr.

at 3-4.)

granted.

The court ruled that the motion to dismiss was

(Tr. at 4 .) The Order and Judgments were filed with the

court on or about July 8, 1997.
33-35 for David.)

(R. at 31-33 for Cynthia and R. at

The Defendants filed Objections to Order and

Judgments on or about July 18, 1997.
R. at 38-43 for David.)

(R. at 36-42 for Cynthia and

The Plaintiff filed a Reply to Objections

to Order and Judgment on or about August 4, 1997.
Cynthia and R. at 44-46 for David).

(R. at 43-45 for

The Order and Judgments were

signed by the court August 29, 1997, and Plaintiff filed its
Appeals September 26, 1997.

(R. at 31-33 and 47-48 for Cynthia and

R. at 33-35 and 48-49 for David.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendants waived their right to a trial de novo by
pleading guilty at the Justice Court level. Once a guilty plea has
been entered there are no issues for trial.

The judgment after a

plea of guilty can still be reviewed de novo by the district court;
however only the judgment is reviewed.

The proper method of

contesting a guilty plea is to move to withdraw the plea not
appeal.
The Utah R. Crim. P. have a mechanism for reviewing a final
dismissal of a case. Utah R. Crim. F. 26(3) (a) allows the state to
appeal without limitation a final judgment of dismissal.

The

decision appealed by the state is one of first impression in the
district court and not part of the decision appealed from the
justice court, therefore not limited by Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12) (a) .
The district court abused its discretion in dismissing the
case at the pretrial stage for lack of response by the state to
discovery.

Utah R. Crim. P. 16 sets forth less harsh remedies for

discovery violations which should be utilized prior to a dismissal
of a case.

Dismissal is only proper when all other attempts to

mitigate have failed.

5

ARGUMENT
1.

TRIAL DE NOVO
The defendants waived their right to a trial de novo by
pleading guilty at the justice court level•
Utah

Code

Ann.

§78-5-120

(1996, Supp

1997)

states

the

following:
Any person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a
justice court, whether rendered by default or after
trial, is entitled to a trial de novo in the district
court of the county as provided by law. The judgment
after trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court
rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.
This section of the Code implies that a trial or default took place
in the justice court. Default suggests that the defendants failed
to defend their position or show up for court.
case now before the court.

Such is not the

The defendants took an active part in

the justice court action by pleading guilty.

In doing so they

waived certain rights including the ability to have a trial de
novo.

Had they not shown up and there had been a forfeiture or a

trial in absentia then they could have had a trial de novo in the
district court because they had not waived their rights by entering
a guilty plea.

"A voluntary plea of guilty

or no contest

constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional
issues..." State v. Smith. 883 P.2d 371, 372 (UtahCt. App. 1992),
see also State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and
State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
6

The

defendants plead guilty and admitted to the charges.

A trial on

the evidence is not a jurisdictional issue therefore the defendants
are not allowed a trial de novo in the district court.
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12) which reads, "An appeal may be taken
to the district court from a judgment rendered in the justice court
under this rule, except: (a) the case shall be tried anew in the
district court..." does not necessarily imply that the defendants
get a trial de novo.

Utah R. Crim P. 26(12).

"Once a plea of

guilty is knowingly and voluntarily entered, there are no issues
for trial." State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248, 1249 (Utah 1977).

By

pleading guilty the defendants acknowledged that they were guilty
of the offense charged.

Utah Code Ann. §77-13-2

(1995) .

The

defendants in this case can still have the judgment appealed to the
district

court

and the district

court will then review that

judgment de novo i.e. giving no deference to the justice court's
decision.

The defendants plead guilty in this case therefore

waiving a trial on the issues.
The Court of Appeals in Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) explains the relief for a defendant once a guilty
plea has been entered.
In Gibbons, [State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)]
the Supreme Court determined that a defendant could not
simply appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea. Id.
at 1311-12. Rather, defendant must first file a motion
to withdraw plea, giving the court who took the plea the
first chance to consider defendant's arguments. Id. If
7

the motion is denied, defendant could then appeal-- not
from the conviction per se, but from the denial of the
motion.
See id. . . .Defendant must first move to set
aside the plea; he or she can not challenge the plea for
the first time on appeal from the conviction.
Summers at 342-43. "A defendant is obliged to seek a trial court's
ruling on an issue before the issue can be raised in an appellate
court."

State

v.

Johnson.

856

P.2d

1064,

1067

(Utah

1993)

(citations omitted) . The defendants in this case should have first
moved to withdraw their guilty pleas in order to properly contest
their guilty pleas.
This case is distinguishable from Kanab v. Guskey, 337 Utah
Adv. R. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d
853 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) aff'd 788 P.2d 513 (Utah), cert denied,
489 U.S. 841, 111 S. Ct. 120, 112 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1990) , and State v.
Matus, 789 P.2d 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) in that in all of those
cases the defendants went through the trial process in the justice
court and appealed.

The defendants in the matter before the court

did not have a trial in the justice court they merely entered
guilty pleas and then appealed the decision of the court.

The

defendants waived their right to a trial and therefore a trial de
novo in the district by pleading guilty.
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2.

APPEAL OF DISMISSAL
a. There must be a mechanism to review the action of the
district court when there is a decision of dismissal.
The Supreme Court of Utah in the State v. Jaeger, 886 P. 2d 53

(Utah 1994) addresses the issue of appeal after a final judgment of
dismissal.

In the Jaeger case the magistrate held there was

insufficient evidence to bind the defendant over for trial and as
a result the magistrate dismissed the information.
appealed.

Id. The state

In the interim the Utah Supreme Court issued State v.

Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991) which held that a decision to
bind a defendant over for trial is not a final, appealable order.
Id. at 468.

The Utah Court of Appeals then dismissed the Jaeger

appeal. The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which
was granted.

Jaeger at 53-54.

The Court in Jaeger went on to analyze the decision not to
bind a case over for trial coupled with the decision of the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986).

The

Court concluded that in such cases when the defendant is not bound
over for trial "coupled with the State's inability to refile under
Brickey, clearly constitutes 'a final judgment of dismissal' as
contemplated by section 77-l8a-(2) (a) (Supp. 1997) , which the State
is entitled to appeal.ff

Jaeger at 55. The Court also states that

"it would be anomalous, indeed, if such a final adjudicative
9

decision were not subject to appeal." Id. Such is the case in the
matter before the Court, it would be anomalous if this final
decision of dismissal were not subject to appeal.

Recognizing a

need for a check on such actions of the district court the Supreme
Court in footnote 3 of the Jaeger case added:
...The State, however, has no comparable procedural
mechanism allowing reexamination of a decision not to
bind a defendant over for trial. Logic suggests that
some mechanism must exist for correcting the mistaken
dismissal of charges where refiling is not an option. A
plain reading of Utah Code Ann. 77-18a-l (2) (a) (Supp.
1994) shows that the Legislature has provided that
mechanism by expressly permitting the State to appeal,
without state limitation, any "final judgment of
dismissal."
Jaeger at footnote 3.
court.

Such is the case in the matter before the

A mechanism must

exist

for correcting

the mistaken

dismissal or procedural mistakes of the district court.
b.

The State's right to appeal a final judgment of dismissal

under Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) is not limited by Utah R.
Crim. P. 26(12)(a) in this case.
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12) (a) limits the right to appeal from a
justice court to a district court and states that the decision of
the district court is final except where the constitutionality of
a statute or ordinance is disputed.

Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12)(a).

The rule states that the case shall be tried anew meaning a trial
de novo on the issues.

Id. Similar to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(12) (a)

is Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120 (1996, Supp. 1997) which states:
10

Any person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a
justice court, whether rendered by default or after
trial, is entitled to a trial de novo in the district
court of the county as provided by law. The judgment
after trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court
rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-120 (1996, Supp. 1997) . This case has not yet
come under the scrutiny of these provisions.

Both of these

statutes and rules contemplate a trial de novo and therefore a
review of the issues presented before the justice court.
There has not been a trial in the district court because the
case had not yet reached the trial stage.

The district court

dismissed the case for a discovery violation at pretrial.

The

decision or issue that was appealed from the justice court has not
yet come before the district court.

Thus far the district court

has not acted as an appellate court in reviewing a decision of the
justice court.

The district court in this case has acted only as

a trial court hearing the matter for the first time.

Since the

defendants plead guilty at the justice court, not until the
district court reviews the defendants' sentences or sentences the
defendants after a trial or another guilty plea does it act as an
appellate court and review the decision of the justice court.
The defendants plead guilty and exhausted their appeal of
their guilty pleas and sentences to the district court. The state
however has not exhausted its ability to appeal. Utah R. Crim. P.
26(3) (a) and Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-l (2) (a) (1995, Supp. 1997)
11

allow an appeal by the prosecution from "a final judgment of
dismissal."

Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) and Utah Code Ann. §77-18a-

1(2) (a) (1995, Supp. 1997). No restrictions have been placed on
this right to appeal a final judgment of dismissal.

The issue of

discovery was never discussed at the justice court level and was
not part of the judgment appealed from the justice court.
matter of first impression for the district court.

It is a

The merits of

the cases against the defendants have not been before a judge. The
decision of the district court was a final judgment of dismissal
and therefore the state is not limited in its appeal.

There has

not been a trial de novo to review the justice court decision and
the issue of discovery was not appealed

from justice court,

therefore it has not been reviewed by the district court acting as
an appellate court for the justice court and not prohibited by Utah
R. Crim. P. 26(12) (a) .
It does not matter that this action was first brought in the
justice court instead of the district court.

Had the justice

court's decision of the case been a final order of dismissal the
state's right to appeal would have been to the district court. The
district court on its own initiative and not in review of anything
the justice court had decided upon entered an order of final
dismissal.

The state is therefore allowed to appeal this decision

since it was not a matter that had been part of the decision
12

appealed from the justice court.

On the matter of discovery the

district court was not acting in its authority as an appellate
court, it was an issue of first impression for the district court.
The state's ability to appeal final judgments of dismissal is not
limited in Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3).
3.

DISMISSAL OF CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY
The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the case
for

failure

of

the prosecutor

to provide

discovery

at

pretrial.
This case is distinct from the many cases researched for this
issue.

In those cases the case was at the trial stage when the

discovery violation occurred or was discovered.
matter was before the judge for a pretrial.

In this case the

A trial date had not

yet been set.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(b) states that "the prosecutor shall make
all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of
charges and before the defendant is required to plea...." Utah R.
Crim. P. 16(b).

As stated at the hearing the State was still

gathering the information to respond to discovery.
4.)

(See tr. p. 3-

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah

1989) stated,

,f

the crux of a rule 16(g) motion is a requirement

that the moving party show that the other party has failed to
furnish discovery as required by rule 16."
13

Larson at 418.

The

matter before the Court now was set for pretrial not trial. There
was still ample time to respond to the discovery prior to trial.
The dismissal of the case at that stage of the case was an abuse of
discretion.
The Utah Supreme Court also reviewed the issue of discovery
violations in the case of State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879 (Utah
1988) .

In this case the Court looked to their decision and

interpretation of the case of State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah
1987) .

The

Court

in Griffiths

explained

the procedure for

determining abuse of discretion as follows:
In Knight/ after having determined that the prosecutor
violated his discovery duties, we reached the issue of *
whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing
to grant the defendant's requested relief. We indicated
that the determination of whether the trial court abused
its discretion in denying defendant relief under rule
16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure turned upon
"whether the prosector's failure to produce the requested
information resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant
reversal under Rule 3 0."
Griffiths, at 882 (footnotes omitted).

Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a)

states "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not

14

affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded."
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a).
In this case the substantial rights of the defendants were not
prejudiced, therefore the failure of the State to provide discovery
should be disregarded.

Clearly the defendants are entitled to

discovery as set forth in Utah R. Crim. P 16; however, dismissing
the case for lack of response to discovery at the pretrial stage of
this case was an abuse of discretion.

The act of the Judge

dismissing the case was an infringement of the substantial rights
of the state.
The case of State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) is directly on point for remedies regarding discovery.
In the Christofferson case on the morning of trial the prosecution
became aware of exculpatory statements made by the defendant to the
officer.

The prosecutor did not disclose these statements to the

defense and
testified.

the defense

learned about

them when the officer

The defense did not object, move for a continuance, or

request a mistrial.

The defense cross examined the officer and

then at a recess moved to dismiss the charges based on the
discovery violation.

Christofferson, at 945-46.

Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g) sets forth the remedy for a violation
of Utah R. Crim. P. 16.
If at any time during the course of proceedings it is
brought to the attention of the court that a party has
15

failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing
evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order
as it deems just under the circumstances.
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(g).

The Court in the Christofferson case

explains that dismissal was unreasonable when other less harsh
remedies were available.
When the discovery violation was brought to the attention
of the court, defendant did not object, request a
continuance, or call for a mistrial. Rather, defendant
moved to dismiss. Under the circumstances, it was not
unreasonable for the trial court to deem it unjust to
grant the defendant's motion when there were other, less
harsh remedies specifically mentioned in the statute
available to him."
Christofferson, at 948.
The court in Christofferson also looked to the Knight and
Griffiths cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court stated that " [a] pivotal fact in our
reversal of Knight was defense counsel's timely efforts
to obtain relief in order to mitigate the potential or
suffered prejudice caused by the prosecutor's wrongful
conduct." Griffiths, at 882-83 (footnote omitted). The
court went on to hold that by failing to move for a
continuance, "defendant [Griffiths] waived relief under
rule 16(g) as implemented in Knight by not making timely
efforts to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused by
the prosecutor's conduct."
Id. at 883 (footnote
omitted) ; see also State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49, 53
(Utah 1981).
Christofferson, at 948.
The statute offers several remedies to the court including
permitting discovery or inspection, continuances, or not allowing
16

evidence to be introduced at trial. The district court in the case
now before the Court abused its discretion by dismissing the case.
The matter was before the court for pretrial.

The defendants had

not tried to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice if any to them by
a simple letter or phone call to follow up on discovery. There was
plenty of time to respond to discovery prior to trial.

The

pretrial could have been continued and the state given a time limit
within which to respond to discovery.
remedies

available

to

dismissing the case.

the

court

that

There were a number of
were

less

harsh

than

"Dismissal is proper only when all other

attempts to mitigate damage caused by unexpected evidence have
failed."

Id.

No attempts to mitigate were present in this case.

Dismissal was an abuse of the court's discretion therefore the
dismissal should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
Defendants plead guilty at the trial stage of this case, by
doing so they waived their right to a trial.

Once a guilty plea

has been entered there are not any issues for trial.

The actions

of the defendants have precluded them from having a trial de novo
in the district court.
The State's right to appeal a final judgment of dismissal
under Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) is not limited by Utah R. Crim. P.
26(12) (a) . A plain reading of Utah R. Crim. P. 26(3) (a) shows that
17

the

legislature has provided

mistaken dismissal of charges.

a mechanism

for correcting the

There is no limitation placed on

the prosecution's appeal of a final judgment of dismissal.

The

matter before the district court was one of first impression and
not a matter on appeal from the justice court, therefore the right
of the state to appeal had not been exhausted by the defendants'
appeal from the justice court.
It was not appropriate for the district court to dismiss this
case for failure to provide discovery when less harsh remedies were
specified in the statute, the matter before the court was a
pretrial and not a trial, and the defendants made no attempt to
mitigate their prejudice if any.

Dismissal is proper only in

situations where all other attempts to mitigate have failed.

The

dismissal should be set aside and the case remanded to the trial
court to continue with the trial process.
DATED this

Or

day of March, 1998.
Daggett County Attorney

By-.^Uikk^

Qfilmn

Rachelle L. Palmer
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contemplated by plea bargain is subsequently
determined to be illegal or unauthorized, 87
A L R 4th 384

77-13-2.

Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «$=» 268

R e c o r d of p l e a — Effect of e a c h k i n d of plea.

Every plea shall be entered upon the record of the court and shall have the
following effect.
(1) A plea of not guilty is a denial of the guilt of the accused and puts in
issue every material allegation of the information or indictment;
(2) A plea of guilty is an acknowledgment that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged; and
(3) A plea of no contest indicates the accused does not challenge the
charges in the information or indictment and if accepted by the court shall
have the same effect as a plea of guilty and imposition of sentence may be
rendered in the same manner as if a plea of guilty had been entered.
History: C. 1953, 77-13-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

NO contest.

Guilty plea
77
.
U
pp

Guilty plea.
Effect.
Unless timely withdrawn, a plea of guilty
placed a defendant in the same position as a
verdict of a jury finding him guilty of the charge
aaer a fair and impartial trial A plea of guilty
was a confession of the correctness of the accusation which dispensed with the necessity of
proof thereof State v Stewart, 110 Utah 203,
171 P2d 383 (1946)

—Appellate review.
The general rule of appellate procedure preeludes appellate review of Fourth Amendment
issues when the defendant has entered an
unconditional no contest plea after losing his
suppression motion However, this rule is mapphcable when the plea entered by the defend a n t W l t h t h e c o n s e n t 0 f the prosecution and
a c c e p t e d by the trial judge specifically pres e r v e s t h e S U pp r e s s i 0 n issue for appeal and
a l l o w s W l t h d r a w a l o f t h e p i e a if the defendant's
a r g u m e n t s i n f a v o r o f s u p p r ession are accepted
fe
fche
llate court S t a t e v s
758 p2d
A „ IQQQ\
Q~K m*Jun*
935 (Utah Ct ApP

1988)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <£=» 269

77-13-3. Court approval of no contest plea required.
A plea of no contest may be entered by the accused only upon approval of the
court and only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the
interest of the public in the effective administration of justice.
History: C. 1953, 77-13-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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77-18-17. Retroactive application.
The provisions of Sections 77-18-9 through 77-18-17 apply retroactively to
all arrests and convictions regardless of the date on which the arrests were
made or convictions were entered.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-17, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 143, § 9.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 143

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER 18a
THE APPEAL
Section
77-18a-l.
77-18a-2.

Appeals — When proper.
Capital cases.

77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper.
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal
would be in the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
History: C. 1953, 77«18a«l, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 7, § 10.
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter

recodifies Subsections (2), (3), and (9) of former
Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Appealability.
Appeal by defendant.
Appeal by prosecut.on.
Arrest of judgment.
Bind over orders.
Death penalty cases.
"Dismissal."

Double jeopardy.
" a b . e a f 9 «n>us ruhng
Oral statements from bench.
Suppression orders.
Appealability.
Tb determine whether an appeal falls within
one of the enumerated grounds, the appellate
court looks to the substance of the ruling and
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not to the label attached by a trial judge. State
v. Workman, 806 R2d 1198 (Utah C t App.),
aff'd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
Appeal by d e f e n d a n t .
A purported second judgment and sentence,
which was clearly an attempt to render a judgment in criminal proceeding which if valid
would have affected defendant's rights, was
appealable. State v. Alexander, 15 Utah 2d 14,
386 R2d 411 (1963).
Denial of motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is a "final" judgment; rights protected by the double jeopardy guarantee necessitate review on appeal before a second trial if
defendant is to enjoy full protection of the
clause. State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah
1979).
Appeal by p r o s e c u t i o n .
District court's judgment, discharging defendant in criminal prosecution and releasing his
bail, entered on plea to court's jurisdiction, was
(finaljudgment from which state might appeal.
i State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553 (1899).
[, State had right of appeal from judgment
i discharging defendant, in prosecution for felony, on ground that information did not state
I facts sufficient to constitute public offense.
I State v. McKenna, 24 Utah 317, 67 P. 815
1(1902).
E The state had no right to appeal sentence
| imposed upon defendant since the imposition of
tsentence was part of the judgment, and not an
torder made after judgment. State v. Kelbach,
|569P2d 1100 (Utah 1977K
i Former section did not authorize the prosecuktion to appeal an acquittal, no matter how
^overwhelming the evidence against the defenEdant may be. State v. Musselman, 667 P2d
11061 (Utah 1983).
• Where dismissal of charge was based on trial
•Court's construction of the applicable law before
•the court ruled on the sufficiency of the evi•dence to convict, the ruling was, in effect, a
••final judgment of dismissal" and therefore was
•ippealable even though the ruling was made at
•the close of all the evidence State v.
•Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
v The state may not, following a pretrial ruling
Suppressing some state's evidence, request dis• missal of a criminal case in order to avoid the
•discretionary appeal provisions and to obtain
• i n appeal of right. State v. Waddoups, 712 P.2d
•223 (Utah 1985).
K A trial court's dismissal of a case on the
•ground that the prosecution has not proved an
•element of the offense beyond a reasonable
•doubt is in substance an acquittal and therefore
Ml not appealable. State v. Chugg, 749 P.2d 1279
•Utah Ct. App 1988).
K State could not appeal an order granting
Kefendant a new trial after he moved to arrest

77-18a-l

judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial
where the trial court did not, in substance,
grant an arrest of judgment but a new trial.
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
An appeal by the state properly lies only from
the order of dismissal and does not lie from the
denial of a motion for new trial. State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Arrest of j u d g m e n t .
A trial court's ruling was an arrest of judgment and not an acquittal where the trial court
found that the facts proved did not constitute a
crime because the defendant, a general partner,
could not have committed theft by taking partnership property. Although the trial court's order was also labeled an acquittal, the order was
not based on a finding of insufficient evidence.
Thus, the state had a right to appeal. State v.
Larsen, 834 P.2d 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
B i n d o v e r orders.
Defendant, a juvenile whose preliminary examination was conducted in district court
rather than in circuit court, was not denied the
right to review of the bind over order by a
superior court, since he had the same right to
seek review as does any other criminal defendant. State v. Schreuder, 712 P2d 264 (Utah
1985).
D e a t h p e n a l t y cases.
While Utah law does not compel a defendant
sentenced to death to go through every procedure that a defendant might voluntarily invoke, the law does require one automatic appeal even when "the defendant has chosen not
to pursue his own appeal " State v. Holland, 777
P2d 1019 Utah 1989)
"Dismissal."
The language "a final judgment of dismissal"
refers to dismissals where the trial court construes the applicable law before ruling on the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict and before
a final judgment. State v. Amador, 804 P2d
1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
When a motion to suppress evidence is renewed following closing arguments and is
granted, the order granting the motion is an
acquittal and not a "dismissal" as that term is
used in this section and Utah R. Cnm. P.
26(3)(a), and is not subject to appeal by the
state. State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990», cert, denied, 815 P2d 241 (Utah
1991).
. Ruling labeled as a "dismissal" was not appealable because the judge's decision came after trial of the issues involved and was a ruling
on the sufficiency of the evidence. State v.
Workman, 806 P2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App.), afFd,
852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
Trial court's ruling at the end of the state's
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case that "the state failed to present sufficient
evidence to make out a prima facie case on any
of the remaining counts of the information" and
dismissal with prejudice was an acquittal and
not a dismissal. State v. Jackson, 857 R2d 267
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Double jeopardy.
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss based
upon former jeopardy defense was not a final
judgment from which an appeal could be taken.
State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978).
Habeas corpus ruling*
District court's ruling on habeas corpus petition was final, appealable judgment. Winnovich
v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988 (1908).

Oral statements from bench.
Oral statements made from the bench are not
the judgment of the case and therefore are not
appealable. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885
(Utah 1978).
Suppression orders.
An appellate court will review suppression
orders on appeal from a dismissal only wheie
the trial court certifies that the evidence suppressed substantially impairs the prosecution's
case. The Supreme Court requires the state to
request dismissal with prejudice to obtain review of suppression orders on an appeal of right
from a dismissal. State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528
(Utah 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — When criminal case becomes moot
so as to preclude review of or attack on conviction or sentence, 9 A.L.R.3d 462.
Appealability of orders or rulings, prior to
final judgment in criminal case, as to accused's
mental competency, 16 A.L.R.3d 714.
Court's presentence inquiry as to, or consideration of, accused's intention to appeal as
error, 64A.L.R.3d 1226.
Validity and effect of criminal defendant's
express waiver of right to appeal as part of
negotiated plea agreement, 89 A.L.R.3d 864.
Appeal by state of order granting new trial in
criminal case, 95 A.L.R.3d 596.
Judgment favorable to convicted criminal defendant in subsequent civil action arising out of

same offense as ground for reversal of conviction, 96 A.L.R.3d 1174.
Waiver or estoppel in incompetent legal representation cases, 2 A.L.R.4th 807.
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding appellate and
postconviction remedies, 15 A.L.R.4th 582.
Presence of alternate juror in jury room as
ground for reversal of state criminal conviction,
15 A.L.R.4th 1127.
Appealability of order suspending imposition
or execution of sentence, 51 A.L.R.4th 939.
Abatement effects of accused's death before
appellate review of federal criminal conviction,
80 A.L.R. Fed. 446.

77-18a-2. Capital cases.
After the resolution of an initial appeal of a capital case when the sentence
of death has been imposed, a subsequent appeal may not be entertained by any
court and a stay of execution of the sentence may not be granted when the
appeal does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or when the new
matter could have been raised at the previous appeal.
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-2, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 7, § 11.

CHAPTER 19
THE EXECUTION
Section
77-19-1.
77-19-2.
77-19-3.

Judgment for fine or costs — Enforcement.
Judgment of imprisonment —
Commitment.
Special release from city or county
jail — Purposes.

Section
77-19-4.
77-19-5.
77-19-6.
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Special release from city or county
jail — Conditions and limitations.
Special release from city or county
jail — Revocation.
Judgment of death — Warrant —
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CHAPTER 18a
THE APPEAL
Section
77-18a-1.

Appeals — When proper.

77-18a-l.

Appeals — When proper.

(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment t h a t affects the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony
information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal
would be in the interest of justice;
(f) under circumstances not amounting to a final order under subsection (2)(a), a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial on a felony as
charged or a pretrial order dismissing or quashing in part a felony
information, when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides
t h a t the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(g) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l, e n a c t e d by L.
1990, ch. 7, $ 10; 1995, ch. 65, § 1; 1997, ch.
364, § 1.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added the phrase

beginning "including a dismissal" to Subsection
(2)(ah
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997,
added Subsection (2)(f) and made related stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Dismissal."
A preliminary-hearing magistrate's order
dismissing a felony information and discharging the defendant based on the magistrate's
conclusion that there was insufficient probable

cause to bind the defendant over for trial was "a
final judgment of dismissal" and the state was
entitled to appeal. State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53
(Utah 1994).
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(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The t e r m of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in t h a t office no more t h a n
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for a n acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of t h e presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the s a m e as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, eh. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Stare decisis.
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the
Court of Appeals governs all later cases invoiving the same legal issues decided by other

78-2a-3.

panels of that court and all courts of lower
rank. Renn v. U t a h State Bd. of Pardons, 904
R2d 677 (Utah 1995).

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of N a t u r a l
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and t h e state engineer,
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
14
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except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
| (j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, c h . 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, $ 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, c h . 268, § 22; 1992, c h . 127, § 12; 1994,
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch.
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsection (2Mh) and redesignated former Subsections
(2)(hj through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through
(k).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and
inserted ''Administrative Procedures Act" in
Subsection (4).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995,
substituted "School and Institutional Trust

Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the
executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources" for "Board of State Lands" in Subsection (2)(a).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry,
Fire and State Lands" for ''Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry" in Subsection <2Ka).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 198, effective
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2>(d>,
listing appeals from circuit courts, and redesignated former Subsections (2)<e) to 12 M k) as
(2)(d) to (2)(j).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Decisions of Board of Pardons.
Extraordinary writs.
Final order.
Habeas corpus proceedings.
Post-conviction review.
Scope.
— Sentence reduction.
Cited.
D e c i s i o n s of Board of P a r d o n s .
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, except when the petition additionally challenges
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree
felony or a capital felony. Then the appeal is to
be heard by the Supreme Court. Preece v.
House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994).

E x t r a o r d i n a r y writs.
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over a
petition for a writ of mandamus directed
against a judge of the district court based on its
authority under this section to enforce compliance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction. Barnard v Murphy,
882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The term ''original" in § 78-2-2(2) adds nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction —
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals —
because jurisdiction over petitions for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a court's jurisdiction to consider a petition originally filed
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction
over cases that originated elsewhere. Barnard
v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Because, under this section, the Court of
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Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over adjudicative proceedings of state agencies, and because § 63-46b-l preserves the availability of
extraordinary writ proceedings to compel
agency actions, the court had jurisdiction of a
writ seeking to compel the recusal of the presiding officer appointed to conduct proceedings
before the Division of Environmental Response
and Remediation. V-l Oil Co. v. Department of
Envtl. Quality, 893 P.2d 1093 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
Final order.
Because an order by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing converting a
citation proceeding from an informal to a formal proceeding was not a "final agency action,"
the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to
consider a petition for review of t h a t order.
Merit Elec. & Instrumentation v. Utah Dep't of
Commerce, 902 P.2d 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Habeas corpus proceedings.
The language of this section is sufficiently
broad to include those cases where a criminal
conviction is involved in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition. Hernandez v.
Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The Court of Appeals lacked original appellate jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of
an extraordinary writ involving an interstate
transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to
his underlying criminal conviction, except that
"but for" the conviction, he would not have been
incarcerated in Arizona and then transferred to
Utah. Ellis v. DeLand, 783 P.2d 559 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
Appeal from the denial of a petition for writ
of habeas corpus was properly before the Court
of Appeals, where the writ challenged the postconviction actions of the board of pardons and
did not challenge the conviction in the trial
court or the sentence, and the fact that defendant was serving a sentence for a first-degree
felony did not require a transfer to the Supreme
Court under the circumstances. Northern v.
Barnes, 814 R2d 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),
aff'd, 870 P.2d 914 (Utah 1992).
Appeal from the dismissal of a habeas corpus
petition, in which defendant claimed only that
his due process rights were violated at a hearing before the parole board, lay to the Court of
Appeals rather than the Supreme Court; the

latter h a s jurisdiction only over direct appeals
of first degree or capital felony convictions and
appeals in habeas corpus cases where the conviction or sentence is challenged. Padilla v.
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 820 R2d 473 (Utah 1991).
P o s t - c o n v i c t i o n review.
Post-conviction review may be used to attack
a conviction in the event of a n obvious injustice
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook,
754 P 2 d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Scope.
This statute defines the outermost limits of
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of
Appeals to review agency decisions only when
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of
review. It is not a catchall provision authorizing
the court to review the orders of every administrative agency for which there is no statute
specifically creating a right to judicial review.
DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764
P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
This statute does not authorize the Court of
Appeals to review the orders of every administrative agency, but allows judicial review of
agency decisions "when the legislature expressly authorizes a right of review." Barney v.
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 ' U t a h 1992).
— Sentence reduction.
When a conviction is reduced under § 76-3402, the appeal lies in the court having jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded in the
judgment of conviction and for which defendant
is sentenced, rather than the degree of crime
charged in the information or found in t h e
verdict. State v. Doung, 813 P2d 1168 (Utah
1991).
C i t e d in Scientific Academv of Hair Design,
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P2d 242 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); In re Topik, 761 P 2 d 32 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); Johanson v. Fischer, 808 P.2d
1083 (Utah 1991); Heinecke v. Department of
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991);
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129.
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78-2-2.

78-3-4

DISTRICT COURTS

Supreme Court jurisdiction.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Transfer authority.
An appeal by criminal defendant under Rule
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
from the denial of his motion to declare his
sentence illegal was not an appeal of his capital

felony conviction and the Supreme Court had
the power to pour it over to the Court of Appeals
for decision. State v. Hua, 926 R2d 884 (Utah
1996).

78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tempore, and practice of law.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah L a w R e v i e w . — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — P a r t III, 1995 U t a h L. Rev. 683.

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
78-2a-3.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Magistrate bind-over orders.
Cited.
Magistrate bind-over orders.
This section does not permit direct interlocu-

tory appeal of magistrate bind-over orders.
State v. Quinn, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996).
C i t e d in Wisden v. Dixie College Parking
C o m m , 935 P.2d 550 (Utah Ct App 1997).

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-4.
78-3-12.5.
78-3-21.

78-3-24.

Jurisdiction — Appeals.
Coats of system.
Judicial Council — Creation —
Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
Court administrator — Powers,
duties, and responsibilities.

Section
78-3-25.

78-3-29

Assistants for administrator of
the courts — Appointment of
trial court executives.
Presiding judge — Associate
presiding judge — Election —
Term — Compensation —
Powers — Duties.

78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline
consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court.

78-5-120

JUDICIAL CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Priority of liens.
Where judgment rendered by justice of peace
became lien upon land by being duly docketed
in district court, but before it was enforced by
levy and sale, mortgage lien also accrued a n d
thereafter time limited by statute for lien of

judgment was allowed to expire, and judgment
was then renewed, lien of first judgment expired, mortgage lien attached as first lien, and
sale on second j u d g m e n t could not affect mortgage lien. Smith v. Schwartz, 21 U t a h 126, 60 P.
305, 81 Am. St. R. 670 (1899).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace
§ 123(7).

Key N u m b e r s . — Justices of t h e Peace «=»
131, 138(10).

78-5-120. Trial de novo in district court.
Any person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a justice court,
whether rendered by default or after trial, is entitled to a trial de novo in the
district court of the county as provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 78-5-120, e n a c t e d b y L.
1989, ch. 157, § 29; 1996, c h . 198, § 60.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, substituted u dis-

trict court" for "circuit court."
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . - Jurisdiction of district court, U t a h Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
in amount in excess of jurisdictional amount,
which error was caused by justice's including in
judgment interest which had accumulated on
notes after action was begun, district court
might properly, on defendants' appeal, have
rendered j u d g m e n t for plaintiff for any amount
which was found due on notes, and which was
within justice's jurisdiction, and, in addition,
for all interest which had accumulated on such
amount after commencement of action in justices' court. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co.
v. Marchant, 11 Utah 68, 39 P. 483 (1895).

ANALYSIS

Appealable judgments.
— Finality.
Jurisdiction of appellate court.
— Amount in controversy.
— Lack of jurisdiction in justice court.
— Waiver of objections.
Consenting that case be set for trial.
Final judgment
— When determined.
Parties entitled to appeal.
— One of several defendants.
Statutory compliance.
Appealable judgments.
— Finality,
Justice's judgment was final for purpose of
taking appeal when it terminated action or
proceeding in which it was rendered, regardless
of whether rights of parties with reference to
subject m a t t e r of action had been adjudicated.
State v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 36 U t a h
223, 102 P. 868(1909).
J u r i s d i c t i o n of appellate court.
— A m o u n t in controversy.
Where plaintiff, in action on promissory
notes, brought m justices' court, prayed for
judgment in amount which was within justice's
jurisdiction, held that, notwithstanding j u s tice's error in rendering judgment for plaintiff

— Lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n in j u s t i c e court.
District court was required to reverse if justices' court had no jurisdiction because wrong
venue was shown. Kansas City Hdwe. Co. v.
Neilson, 10 Utah 27, 36 P. 131 (1894).
When subject matter of suit was not within
jurisdiction of justice, it was not within jurisdiction of district court on appeal. H a m n e r v.
B.K. Bloch & Co., 16 Utah 436, 52 P. 770, 67
Am. St. R. 643 (1898).
Where justices' court had been completely
ousted of all jurisdiction over case, except for
purpose of transferring case to some other
justices' court, distiict court could not acquire
jurisdiction by appeal. State v. Third Judicial
Dist. Court, 36 Utah 68, 104 P. 750 (1909);
Wheatley v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 49 Utah
105, 162 P. 86(1916).
Where justice of peace court was without
jurisdiction of subject matter of action com-
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JUSTICE COURTS
menced therein, appellate court to which case
was appealed did not acquire jurisdiction, even
though it would have had original jurisdiction
of subject matter. Burt & Cariquist Co. v.
Marks, 53 Utah 77, 177 P. 224 (1918).

justices'court was to be determined with regard
to law at time of appeal. State v. Third Judicial
Dist. Court, 32 Utah 418, 91 P. 133 (1907)

- Waiver of o b j e c t i o n s .

_

C o n s e n t i n g that c a s e be s e t for trial.
While party could waive irregularities in taking of appeal and service of notices by express
or unequivocal act, he did not waive jurisdictional defects on appeal from justice's court by
consenting t h a t case be set for trial after motion to dismiss appeal had been overruled.
Steele & Co. v. Third Dist. Court, 41 Utah 402,
126 P. 321 (1912).
Final j u d g m e n t
Where parties, on appeal to court having
original jurisdiction of subject matter, submitted controversy for trial and adjudication, and
cause proceeded to trial and final judgment,
they would be held to have waived their right to
object to jurisdiction of appellate court. Burt &
Cariquist Co. v. Marks, 53 Utah 77, 177 P. 224
(1918).

Where action could have been prosecuted
against only one of defendants, and judgment
was rendered against all, any one of defendants
could appeal from judgment to district court
and have case tried there as though he were
only defendant. Nicolo v. Evans, 57 Utah 526,
195 P. 202 (1921).

P a r t i e s e n t i t l e d to appeal.

- W h e n determined.
Jurisdiction of district court of appeal from
I

Q n e of geyeral

defendants

.

Statutory compliance.
Appeals from justices' courts were purely
statutory, and statutes granting them were to
wl
£ J * l e a s t T substantially c^Po%
n ^'
H
a n
V LeW1S
31 Utah
1<9
8? R
167
^
'
'
'
(190b).
T h e ri ht of
S
appeal from justices' courts to
district courts was guaranteed by constitution
ltsel
f» b u t t h e exercise of such right depended
upon substantial compliance with statute
State v Third Judicial Dist Court, 36 Utah
2 6 7 , 103 P 261 (1909)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. J u r 2d Justices of the
Peace § 82 et seq
C.J.S. — 51 C J S. Justices of the Peace
§ 126 et seq

Key N u m b e r s . — Justices of the Peace c=>
140 et seq.

78-5-121. Docket to be kept — Enumeration of entries
required.
Every justice court judge shall keep or cause to be kept a docket. The
following information shall be entered in the docket under the title of the
action to which it relates:
(1) the title to every action or proceeding;
(2) the object of the action or proceeding, and the amount of any money
claimed;
(3) the date of the service of the summons and the time of its return;
(4) a statement of the fact if an order to arrest the defendant is made or
a writ of attachment is issued;
(5) the time when the parties or any party appears, or a party's
nonappearance, if default is made;
(6) minutes of the pleadings and motions in writing by referring to
them, and if not in writing, by a concise statement of the material parts of
the pleadings;
(7) every adjournment, stating on whose application and to what time;
(8) a demand for a trial by jury, when made, by whom, and the order for
the jury;
(9) the time appointed for the return of the jury and for the trial;
155
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78-5-105. Jurisdiction of justice court and juvenile court.
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over traffic misdemeanors and infractions committed by persons 16 or 17 years of age and t h a t occur within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, except those offenses exclusive to t h e
juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104.
(2) If the traffic offense involves the conviction of a person 16 years of age or
older but younger than 18 years of age for an offense under Section 78-3a-506,
the justice court judge shall notify the juvenile court of the conviction.
(3) The justice court has authority to take the juvenile's driver license and
return it to the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, for
suspension under Section 53-3-221.
(4) Justice court judges may transfer matters within the court's jurisdiction
under this section to the juvenile court for postjudgment proceedings according
to rules of the Judicial Council.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 78-5-105, e n a c t e d by L.
1989, c h . 157, § 14; 1989, c h . 150, $ 6; 1989,
ch. 188, § 9; 1990, ch. 59, § 32; 1991, ch. 268,
$ 40; 1993, c h . 234, § 392; 1995, c h . 277,

§ 12; 1996, c h . 1, § 88; 1997, c h . 365, § 49.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1997 amendment, effective March 2 1 , 1997, substituted
tt
78-3a-506" for "78-3a-517* in Subsection (2).

78-5-120. Trial de novo in district court.
Any person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a justice court,
whether rendered by default or after trial, is entitled to a trial de novo in the
district court of the county as provided by law. The judgment after trial de novo
may not be appealed unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a s t a t u t e
or ordinance.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 78-5-120, e n a c t e d by L.
1989, c h . 157, § 29; 1996, c h . 198, § 60; 1997,
ch. 215, $ 17.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1997 amend-

78-5-127.

ment, effective July 1, 1997, added the last
sentence specifying when judgment affer trial
de novo may be appealed.

Required annual training — Expenses — Failure to attend.

(1) Prior to assuming office all justice court judges shall attend an orientation seminar conducted under the direction of the Judicial Council.
(2) All justice court judges shall attend the continuing education conducted
under the supervision of the Judicial Council each calendar year.
(a) Successful completion of the continuing education requirement
includes instruction regarding competency and understanding of constitutional provisions and laws relating to the jurisdiction of the court, rules
of evidence, and rules of civil and criminal procedure as indicated by a
certificate awarded by the Judicial Council.
(b) The county or municipality creating and maintaining a justice court
shall assume the expenses of travel, meals, and lodging for the judge to
attend education and training seminars conducted by the Judicial Council.
(3) Any judge not obtaining a certificate for two consecutive years may be
removed from office for cause under this section.
(4) The Judicial Council shall inform the Judicial Conduct Commission of
the names of justice court judges failing to comply with this section.
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Rule 16

Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and
places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings,
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable
intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the
time of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall
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be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Continuing duty to disclose.
Depositions.
Discretion of court.
Failure to request discovery.
In general.
Noncompliance.
—Factors considered.
Nondisclosure.
—No reversal.
—No violation of rule.
—Remedies.
—Violation of rule.
—Waiver of error.
Physical evidence.
—Stolen property.
Required disclosure.
—State.
Voluntary prosecutorial response.
Witnesses.
Cited.
Continuing duty to disclose.
Even if there is no court-ordered disclosure,
a prosecutor 8 failure to disclose newly discovered inculpatory information which falis
within the ambit of Subdivision (a), after the
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of
evidence, might so mislead a defendant as to
cause prejudicial error. State v. Carter, 707
P.2d 656 (Utah 1986); State v. Knight, 734
P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).
Depositions.
This rule did not support defendant's argument that he was entitled to depose witnesses
whose testimony had not been transcribed at
the preliminary hearing, held ten years earlier, or whose memory was central to their testimony; Rule 14(h) exclusively governs the
taking of depositions in criminal cases. State v.
Willett, 273 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995).
Discretion of court.
A trial court is allowed broad discretion in
granting or refusing discovery and inspection,
and its determinations on this subject will not
be overturned on appeal unless the court has
abused its discretion. State v. Knill, 656 P.2d
1026 (Utah 1982); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d
1187 (Utah 1984), overruled in part on other
grounds, State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah
1987).
Subdivision (g) grants a trial court ample
discretion to remedy any prejudice to a party
resulting from a breach of the criminal discovery rules. State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah
1989).
Failure to request discovery.
The defendant's claim that the prosecutor's
failure to provide him with a police report de-

scribing a witness' testimony prior to trial was
not entertained, no request for discovery, written or oral, being made at any time. State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985).
To show that defense counsel's failure to
move for formal discovery was ineffective assistance and prejudicial, defendant had to show
that filing a formal discovery motion would
have yielded exculpatory information that was
not supplied under informal discovery pursuant to the prosecutor's "open file policy." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994).
In general.
Discovery powers are conferred upon both
the circuit courts and the district courts. State
v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983).
Although defendant cited U.R.Cr.P. 16 to
support his argument that he was entitled to
depose witnesses whose testimony had not
been transcribed at the preliminary hearing,
held ten years earlier, or whose memory was
central to their testimony, Subdivision (h) of
this rule exclusively governs the taking of depositions in criminal cases and defendant
failed to show how his circumstances fell
within the requirements of Subdivision (h).
State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218 (Utah 1995).
Noncompliance.
The crux of a Subdivision (g) motion is a requirement that the moving party show that the
other party has failed to furnish discovery as
required by the rule. State v. Larson, 775 P.2d
415 (Utah 1989).
—Factors considered.
In ruling on a motion to exclude prosecution
evidence because of a failure to make a full and
accurate response to a defendant's request, a
trial judge must consider and weigh a number
of factors, such as (1) the extent to which the
prosecution's representation is actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the omission or misstatement to lead defense counsel into tactics
or strategy that could prejudice the outcome,
(3) the culpability of the prosecutor in omitting
pertinent information or misstating the facts,
and (4) the extent to which appropriate defense
investigation would have discovered the omitted or misstated evidence. The prosecution has
a duty to make a correct and complete disclosure, but defense counsel also has an affirmative duty to make a reasonable investigation.
State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994).
Nondisclosure.
—No reversal.
In a trial for murder, the prosecution's failure to provide discovery material concerning
testimony regarding the defendant's carrying a
scabbard did not require reversal since a cura-
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tive order adequately advised the jury about
the inadmissibility and questionable nature of
the testimony and, moreover, there was no inference at trial that defendant actually used
the knife. Thus, the testimony was not so prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the verdict as there was no substantial likelihood that
the outcome would have been different without
it. State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah),
cert, denied,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 476, 126 L.
Ed. 2d 427 (1993).
—No violation of rule.
State's failure to disclose to defendant before
trial certain jail records which corroborated defendant's testimony that he requested medical
treatment while in jail did not violate defendant's discovery rights where there was no
showing in record from which it could be fairly
inferred that prosecution knew or should have
known that defendant's request for medical
treatment would ever be an issue or of any importance at trial. State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751
(Utah 1984).
—Remedies.
Dismissal for a discovery violation is proper
only when all other attempts to mitigate damage caused by the unexpected evidence have
failed. State v. Christoflerson, 793 P.2d 944
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
—Violation of rule.
In a battery prosecution, the government's
complete failure to respond in any way to a
discovery request denied the defendant a reasonable opportunity to compel discovery of the
criminal record of the prosecution's only witness, relieved the defense of any responsibility
to show ugood cause," and was prejudicial error
warranting reversal and remand for a new
trial. Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d 582
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
—Waiver of error.
Where the trial court, after denying a motion
to comple discovery, indicated that it would
consider a request to continue the trial date if
necessary, defendant, by not requesting a continuance at that point, essentially waived his
right to claim error later. State v. Larson, 775
P.2d 415 (Utah 1989).
The defendant's failure to mitigate the impact of unexpected testimony resulting from a
discovery violation by objecting to its admission or moving for either a continuance or a
mistrial precluded his claim that it was error
to deny his motion to dismiss. State v.
ChristorTerson, 793 P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App.
1990;.
Physical evidence.
—Stolen property.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
I

Rule 16

denying motion to produce stolen automobile
for inspection by defendant charged with automobile theft where the automobile had been
released and returned to its owner over three
months before defendant's request for its production and there was no showing of its evidentiary significance to the defense. State v. Knill,
656 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1982).
Required disclosure.
—State.
Due process requires the state to disclose
even unrequested information which is or may
be exculpatory. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839
(Utah 1988).
Voluntary prosecutorial response.
There are two requirements that the prosecution must meet when it responds voluntarily
to a request for discovery. First, the prosecution either must produce all of the material
requested or must identify explicitly those portions of the request with respect to which no
responsive material will be provided. Secondly,
when the prosecution agrees to produce any of
the material requested, it must continue to disclose such material on an ongoing basis to the
defense. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah
1987).
Witnesses.
A circuit court judge acted well within his
discretion in ordering the state to disclose the
identity of a witness and the details of a criminal transaction the circuit court found to be
material to a pending criminal prosecution,
where the state itself provided "good cause,"
for purposes of Subdivision (a)(5), by representing that it needed to keep defendant's money to
use at trial, when the only logical use of the
money would of necessity entail proof of the
details of the transaction in which the informant was involved. Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d
740 (Utah 1984).
After the defendant injected a degree of surprise into the proceedings, the State reacted
properly by contacting a rebuttal witness
known to have some expertise in the relevant
area and notifying defense cousel as soon as
possible who he was and what his general purpose would be. Therefore, the state was not
precluded from calling this rebuttal witness
not disclosed before trial in circumstances
where it, in good faith, had no reason to expect
the need for the witness before trial. State v.
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Cited in State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751 (Utah
1984); State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231 (Utah
1987); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah
1988); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah
1988); State v. Sawyers, 819 P.2d 806 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393
(Utah 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — Comment, Confrontation Rights and Preliminary Hearings, 1986
Utah L. Rev. 75.
C.J.S. — 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 486 et
seq.
A.L.R. — Right of accused in state courts to

inspection or disclosure of evidence in possession of prosecution, 7 A.L.R.3d 8.
Right of defendant in criminal case to inspection of statement of prosecution's witness for
purposes of cross-examination or impeachment, 7 A.L.R.3d 181.
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Accused's right to inspection of minutes of
state grand jury, 20 A.L.R.3d 7.
Interference by prosecution with defense
counsel's pretrial interrogation of witnesses, 90
A.L.R.3d 1231.
Accused's right to discovery or inspection of
"rap sheets" or similar police records about
prosecution witnesses 95 A.L.R.3d 832.
Accused s right to depose prospective witnesses before trial in state court, 2 A.L.R4th
Sanctions against defense in criminal case
for failure to comply with discovery requirements 9 A L R.4th 837
Right of accused in state courts to inspection
or disclosure of tape recording of his own statements, 10 A.L.R.4th 1092.
Necessity or permissibility of mental exami-
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nation to determine competency or credibility
of complainant in sexual offense prosecution,
45 A.L.R.4th 310.
What is accused's "statement" subject to
state court criminal discovery, 57 A.L.R.4th
327,
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination
lm
6 3 ^ R A t h 143t
W g h o f d e f e n d a n t i n c r i m i n a l contempt proQeJ
o b ^ information by deposition, 33
A.L.R.5th 761
J 1 1 ^ d n ^ or narcotics involved in alleged
offense as subject to discovery by defendant under Rule 16
of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 109 A.LJt Fed. 363.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •=» 627.5 to
627 9.

Rule 17. The trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial
with the following exceptions:
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may
consent in writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the
time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had
been present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good
cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal
attendance of the defendant at the trial.
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order:
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody;
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury
in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes
written.demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise.
No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified
in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953.
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the
accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally
in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any
number of jurors less than otherwise required.
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in
the following order:
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated;
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge;
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case;
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court to amend records of court, reciting granting of motion by district attorney to dismiss
criminal action and discharging accused from
custody, so as to read that information was dismissed, and not that action was dismissed and
defendant discharged, since court had power,
on its own motion, or on motion of district attorney, to dismiss action, information, or indictment. State ex rel. Barnes v. Second Dist.
Court, 36 Utah 396, 104 P. 282 (1909).
Purpose of statute which provided that reasons for dismissal of criminal action must have
been set forth in order entered upon the
minutes was that all might know what invoked
court's discretion and whether its action was
justified. Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 19 Utah 2d
32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967).
Good cause for delay.
Defendant, who was charged at a time he
had other case pending against him and in one
of those cases requested and received psychiatric examination and who was appointed various counsel because of necessity and at his own
request, was not denied right to speedy trial
where he was held sane on August 14, 1969
and trial was initially set for January 7, 1970
and commenced on April 8, 1970, after disposition of defendant's motion to dismiss made on
January 7. State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136,
478 P.2d 326 (1970).
Magistrate's authority to dismiss.
City court judge acting as a committing magistrate upon a preliminary examination did not
have authority to dismiss criminal proceedings. Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1977).
Offense improperly alleged.
In prosecution for rape of female under 18
years of age, where defendant was given preliminary examination on complaint charging
rape had been committed on April 1, and information charged rape on that date, but proof
showed that female was then over 18 years of
age, and state promptly introduced evidence of
prior acts of intercourse before female became
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18, conviction could not be upheld since defendant was not given benefit of preliminary examination for offense for which he was convicted. State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 P.
1000 (1909).
Reasonableness of delay.
Fact that information was not filed within 30
days after defendant's commitment, did not entitle defendant to discharge, where good cause
for delay was shown. State v. Reynolds, 24
Utah 29, 66 P. 614 (1901).
Review of bindover orders.
A district court's jurisdiction over a motion
to quash a bindover order follows from the authorization in Subdivision (a) of dismissal of
indictments and informations. The motion
focuses a district court's attention on the propriety of its exercise of original jurisdiction,
requiring a determination of whether it can
proceed with the case. The motion is not equivalent to an appeal. State v. Humphrey, 823
P.2d 464 (Utah 1991).
Statutes not in conflict
There was no conflict between statutes providing for dismissal of and bar to further prosecutions against a sole defendant for misdemeanors only and other statutes providing for
dismissal of and bar to further prosecutions,
whether felony or misdemeanor, against one of
several joint defendants for purpose of allowing
dismissed to be witness for the state. In re
Petty, 18 Utah 2d 320, 422 P.2d 659 (1967).
Subsequent prosecution.
Where district court erroneously dismissed
ordinance violation prosecution on appeal from
city court but before arraignment and trial de
novo in district court and that order of dismissal was later reversed by the Supreme Court,
subsequent prosecution of defendant in district
court for the ordinance violation was not "any
other prosecution" within the bar of this section, it was merely the same prosecution which
had never been begun de novo in the district
court and thus was not barred. Boyer v. Larson, 20 Utah 2d 121, 433 P.2d 1015 (1967).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 512 to 519; 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 859 to 875.
C.J.S. — 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 610 et
seq.
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of statute
authorizing dismissal of criminal action upon
settlement of civil liability growing out of act
charged, 42 A.L.R.3d 315.
Propriety of court's dismissing indictment or

prosecution because of failure of jury to agree
after successive trials, 4 A.L.R.4th 1274.
What constitutes "manifest necessity" for
state prosecutor's dismissal of action, allowing
subsequent trial despite jeopardy's having attached, 14 A.L.R.4th 1014.
When does delay in imposing sentence violate speedy trial provision, 86 A.L.R.4th 340.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 574,
576.

Rule 26. Appeals.
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record.
Proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of
the defendant;
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(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides that
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.
(4) (a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving notice
shall be filed with the court.
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another
appeal may be, and is, timely taken.
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court.
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails
to appear for oral argument.
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided.
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the sentence
of death has been imposed, appellant briefs shall be filed within 60 days
of the filing of the record on appeal. Respondent briefs shall be filed
within 60 days of receipt of the appellant brief. All issues to be raised on
appeal shall be included by each party in its appellate brief. Appellant
reply briefs shall be filed within 30 days of receipt of the respondent's
brief.
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing period may be granted to
each party, but only upon application to the Supreme Court showing
extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension.
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral arguments of the case to
be heard not more than ten days after the date of filing of the final brief.
Following oral arguments, the case shall be placed first on the Supreme
Court's calendar, for expeditious determination.
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a subsequent appeal of a
capital case where the sentence of death has been imposed may not be entertained by any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence be granted,
when the appeal does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or
when new matter could have been raised at the previous appeal.
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed and the
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatically
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended by the
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death has
priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the
Supreme Court.
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(11) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals,
as is appropriate, from all final orders and judgments rendered in a district
court or juvenile court under this rule.
(12) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment rendered
in the justice court under this rule, except:
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the district court. The decision of the
district court is final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court;
(b) within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court
shall transmit to the district court a certified copy of the docket, the
original pleadings, all notices, motions, and other papers filed in the case,
and the notice and undertaking on appeal;
(c) stay of execution and relief pending appeal are under Rule 27, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
(d) all further proceedings are in the district court, including any process required to enforce judgment.
(Amended effective November 1, 1996.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment deleted former Subdivision (11), relating
to procedure in appeals from circuit courts; redesignated former Subdivisions (12) and (13)
as (11) and (12); substituted "district court" for
"circuit court" throughout Subdivision (12);
and substituted "Criminal Procedure" for
"Court Procedure" in Subdivision (12)(c).
Compiler's Notes. — This rule governs appeals from district and juvenile courts. The
practice and procedure for taking such appeals,
including the time in which the appeal is filed,
are prescribed by the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

Cross-References. — Appeals from justice
court to district court, § 78-5-120.
Appeals to Court of Appeals, § 78-4-11.
Appellate jurisdiction of district courts, Utah
Const., Art. VIE, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4.
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court,
Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 3; § 78-2-2.
Dismissal if affidavit of impecuniosity is
untrue, § 21-7-7.
Judicial Council, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec.
12.
Right of defendant to appeal, Utah Const,
Art. I, Sec. 12; § 77-1-6.
Right of indigent accused to counsel on appeal, § 77-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALY8I8

Appeal by defendant.
Appeal by prosecution.
—Dismissals.
Appealability.
Applicability of civil rules.
—-Court findings.
Attorney's failure to file notice.
Bind over orders.
Death penalty cases.
Double jeopardy.
Habeas corpus ruling.
Justice court.
Notice of appeal.
Oral statements from bench.
Reversal of order arresting judgment.
Review of acquittal prohibited.
Review of evidence.
Time for appeal.
Cited.
Appeal by defendant
A purported second judgment and sentence,
which was clearly an attempt to render a judgment in criminal proceeding which if valid
would have affected defendant's rights, was appealable. State v. Alexander, 15 Utah 2d 14,
386 P.2d 411 (1963).
Denial of motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is a "final" judgment; rights protected by the double jeopardy guarantee necessitate review on appeal before a second trial if

defendant is to enjoy full protection of the
clause. State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah
1979).
Appeal by prosecution.
District court's judgment, discharging defendant in criminal prosecution and releasing his
bail, entered on plea to court's jurisdiction, was
final judgment from which state might appeal
State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 553 (1899)
State had right of appeal from judgment discharging defendant, in prosecution for felony,
on ground that information did not state facts
sufficient to constitute public offense. State v
McKenna, 24 Utah 317, 67 P. 815 (1902).
The state had no right to appeal sentence
imposed upon defendant since the imposition of
sentence was part of the judgment, and not an
order made after judgment. State v. Kelbach,
569 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977).
This section does not authorize the prosecution to appeal an acquittal, no matter how
overwhelming the evidence against the defendant may be. State v. Museehnan, 667 P.2d
1061 (Utah 1983).
Where dismissal of charge was based on trial
court's construction of the applicable law before the court ruled on the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict, the ruling was, in effect, a
"final judgment of dismissal" under Subdivision (3)(a) and therefore was appealable even
though the ruling was made at the close of all
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the evidence. State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d Attorney's failure to file notice.
1061 (Utah 1983).
Where if, within the statutory period for apThe state may not, following a pretrial rul- peal, defendant has requested counsel to take
ing suppressing some state's evidence, request an appeal and counsel gave defendant reason
dismissal of a criminal case in order to avoid *to believe that he would but then failed to do
the discretionary appeal provisions of Subdivi- so, the remedy to establish the denial of his
sion (3)(e) and to obtain an appeal of right un- right to appeal is not in the Supreme Court but
der Subdivision (3)(a). State v. Waddoups, 712 by a motion for relief under Rule 65B(i),
U.R.C.P. in the sentencing court. State v.
P.2d 223 (Utah 1985).
A trial court's dismissal of a case on the Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981).
If it is found upon a hearing that a defendant
ground that the prosecution has not proved an
element of the offense beyond a reasonable was induced, by reason of his attorney's repredoubt is in substance an acquittal and there- sentation that an appeal would be perfected, to
fore is not appealable. State v. Chugg, 749 P.2d allow his time to take an appeal to expire, or
that he was misled as to his right to appeal, the
1279 (Utah 1988).
State could not appeal an order granting de- defendant should be resentenced nunc pro tunc
fendant a new trial after he moved to arrest upon previous finding of guilt so as to afford
judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial *him an opportunity of prosecuting and perfectwhere the trial court did not, in substance, ing an appeal, since the time for taking such
grant an arrest of judgment but a new trial. appeal would date from the rendition of the
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App. new judgment. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36
(Utah 1981).
1988).
An appeal from the denial of a motion for Bind over orders.
Subdivision (2)(c) governs all appeals from
new trial is not an appeal by the state permitted by Subdivision (3), because the state's ap- bind over orders entered in any court. State v.
peal is not an appeal from a "final judgment of Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985).
Defendant, a juvenile whose preliminary exdismissal." An appeal by the state properly lies
only from the order of dismissal and does not amination was conducted in district court
lie from the denial of a motion for new trial. rather than in circuit court, was not denied the
State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah Ct. App. right to review of the bind over order by a superior court, since he had the same right under
1989).
Subdivision (2)(c) to seek review as does any
—Dismissals.
other criminal defendant. State v. Schreuder,
The language "a final judgment of dismissal" 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985).
in Subdivision (3)(a) refers to dismissals where
the trial court construes the applicable law be- Death penalty cases.
While Utah law does not compel a defendant
fore ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict and before a final judgment. State v. sentenced to death to go through every proceAmador, 804 P.2d 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). dure that a defendant might voluntarily inSubdivision (3) precludes appeals from voke, the law does require one automatic appostjudgment dismissals or vacations. State v. peal even when "the defendant has chosen not
Amador, 804 P.2d 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). to pursue his own appeal." State v. Holland,
In a trial for possession of a controlled sub- 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989).
Execution of criminal defendant may not ocstance where, after all the evidence was in and
both sides presented closing arguments, the de- cur until the Supreme Court determines at
fendant renewed his motion to suppress evi- least that the sentence is in accord with lawful
dence, which was granted, the order appealed process. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah
from was an acquittal and not a "dismissal" as 1989).
Given the procedures required at trial and
that term is used in Subdivision (3)(a) of this
rule, and was not subject to appeal by the state. the careful appellate review given by the SuState v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct. App. preme Court to death penalty cases over the
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). years, a specification of reasons by the sentencing authority on the record for imposing the
Appealability.
death penalty, even if it were practicable, is
To determine whether an appealed decision not necessary to prevent arbitrary and caprifalls within one of the enumerated categories cious sentences. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d
of appealable rulings, the appellate court looks 1019 (Utah 1989).
to the substance of the ruling and not to the Double jeopardy.
label attached by a trial judge. State v. WorkDenial of defendant's motion to dismiss
man, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), aff d, based upon former jeopardy defense was not a
852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
final judgment from which an appeal could be
taken. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah
Applicability of civil rules.
1978).
—Court findings.
Habeas
corpus ruling.
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. (effect of court findings)
District court's ruling on habeas corpus petiapplies in criminal cases by virtue of Subdivision (7) of this rule. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d tion was final, appealable judgment. Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988 (1908).
191 (Utah 1987).
Rule 52, U.R.C.P. (findings by the court) ap- Justice court.
plies to criminal actions. State v. Goodman,
Under Subdivision (13)(a), the Court of Ap763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988).
peals has jurisdiction over a criminal matter
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originating in a justice court only when the
validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or
statute has been raised in the justice court. An
oblique reference on appeal to constitutional
rights or the invalidity of defendant's conviction cannot satisfy the statutory requirement.
Without specifying the statute challenged and
the legal basis, a mere allegation of a violation
of one's constitutional rights is insufficient to
confer jurisdiction. City of Monticello v.
Christensen, 769 P.2d 853 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), affd, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah), cert, denied,
498 U.S. 841, 111 S. Ct. 120, 112 L. Ed. 2d 89
(1990).
The right to an "appeal" from a court not of
record is satisfied by provision for a trial de
novo in a court of record. City of Monticello v.
Christensen, 788 P 2d 513 (Utah), cert, denied,
498 U.S. 841, 111 S. Ct. 120, 112 L. Ed. 2d 89
(1990).
Notice of appeal.
Unless record on appeal showed that notice
of appeal was served upon district attorney or
his assistant, appeal would be dismissed. People v. Fennel, 4 Utah 112, 7 P. 525 (1885).
Oral statements from bench.
Oral statements made from the bench are
not the judgment of the case and therefore are
not appealable. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885
(Utah 1978).
Reversal of order arresting judgment.
If a jury verdict of guilty is set aside by an

418

order of a trial judge pursuant to a motion in
arrest of judgment, that order may be appealed
pursuant to Subdivision (2)(b), and if reversed,
the guilty verdict is reinstated. State v.
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
Review of acquittal prohibited.
An appellate court may not reassess an acquittal even though the acquittal was made
under an incorrect application of the law or an
improper determination of the facts. State v.
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983).
Review of evidence.
The defendant's motion for dismissal having
been granted, in analyzing the evidence to see
if a case could be made out against him, it was
reviewed by the Supreme Court in the light
most favorable to the state. State v. Brennan,
13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1962).
Time for appeal.
Time within which appeal must be taken
was jurisdictional. Sullivan v. District Court,
65 Utah 400, 237 P. 516 (1925).
The 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case is jurisdictional and
cannot be enlarged by the Supreme Court.
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981).
Cited in McRae & DeLand v. Feltch, 669
P.2d 404 (Utah 1983); State v. Wright, 744
P.2d 315 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Matus,
789 P.2d 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Menzies, 845 P.2d 220 (Utah 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Confession of
Error, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 286.
C.J.S. — 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1660 et
seq.
A.L.R. — When criminal case becomes moot
so as to preclude review of or attack on conviction or sentence, 9 A.L.R.3d 462.
Appealability of orders or rulings, prior to
final judgment in criminal case, as to accused's
mental competency, 16 A.L.R.3d 714.
Court's presentence inquiry as to, or consideration of, accused's intention to appeal as
error, 64 A.L.R.3d 1226.
Validity and effect of criminal defendant's
express waiver of right to appeal as part of negotiated plea agreement, 89 A.L.R.3d 864.
Appeal by state of order granting new trial
in criminal case, 95 A.L.R.3d 596.
Judgment favorable to convicted criminal

defendant in subsequent civil action arising
out of same offense as ground for reversal of
conviction, 96 A.L.R.3d 1174.
Waiver or estoppel in incompetent legal representation cases, 2 A.L.R.4th 807
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation
of criminal client regarding appellate and postconviction remedies, 15 A.L.R.4th 582.
Presence of alternate juror in jury room as
ground for reversal of state criminal conviction, 15 A.L.R.4th 1127.
Appealability of order suspending imposition
or execution of sentence, 51 A.L.R.4th 939.
Abatement effects of accused's death before
appellate review of federal criminal conviction,
80 A.L.R. Fed. 446.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=* 1004 et
seq.

Rule 27. Stays pending appeal.
(a) (1) A sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal or a petition for
other relief is pending.
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall be stayed if an
appeal is taken and a certificate of probable cause is issued.
(3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any order of judgment in favor of the defendant may be granted by the court upon good
cause pending disposition of the appeal.
(b) A person who has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a
term of incarceration in jail or prison, and who has filed a notice of appeal,
shall be detained, unless the trial judge issues a certificate of probable cause
and determines by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not
likely to flee during pendency of the appeal and that the defendant will not
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Rule 30. Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
Cross-References. — Arraignment, necessity of objection to preserve error, U.R.Cr.P. 10.

Indictments and informations,
errors, U.ILCr.P. 4.

harmless

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Admission of photographic evidence.
Clerical mistakes.
—Defendant's right of allocution.
Harmless error.
Minor defect.
Substantial right affected.
—State's burden of persuasion.
Variances.
Cited.
Admission of photographic evidence.
Even though admission of photographs of
manslaughter victim served only to create
emotional impact on jury, their admission was
not reversible error; they were not so gruesome
or offensive that their absence would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for defendant. State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979).
Clerical mistakes.
—Defendant's right of allocution.
The defendant's due process right of allocution was satisfied at a sentencing hearing held
in his presence, where he was addressed by the
judge and elected to speak, and an amended
judgment subsequently entered by the trial
court, at which the defendant was not present
nor represented by counsel, reflected only a
correction of a clerical mistake in his sentence.
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988).
Harmless error.
In prosecution for having carnal knowledge
of female under age of 18 years, although it
was error to allow prosecutrix to testify to acts
of sexual intercourse after one relied on for
conviction, such error was not prejudicial to
defendant so as to require reversal. State v.
Mattivi, 39 Utah 334, 117 P. 31 (1911).
Where defendant in murder prosecution contested every step taken by state during
progress of trial and was afforded every opportunity to defend charge, and his counsel insisted upon every right to which the law entitled him, mere fact that defendant's plea of not
guilty was received on legal holiday did not
constitute prejudicial error. State v. Estes, 52
Utah 572, 176 P. 271 (1918).
In a prosecution of a state fish and game
warden for appropriating state money to his
own use, an instruction in which the court read
the entire statute on misuse of public money
was erroneous, but since it did not prejudice
rights of defendant, such error was diregarded.
State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968
(1922).
The admission of testimony at trial in violation of defendant's constitutional confrontation

rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
where such testimony was merely cumulative.
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982).
Trial court's instruction that flight from
scene of crime of aggravated burglary
amounted to implied admission of guilt was erroneous, but was not prejudicial, since there
was other evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah
1983).
The prosecutor's impermissible comment on
the defendant's exercise of his constitutional
right not to take the stand did not require reversal where the other evidence of guilt was
convincing, defense counsel's prompt objections
prevented the prosecutor from making any real
point of the failure to testify, and the judge's
quick and decisive admonition to the jury and
prosecutor further obviated any harm that
might have resumed from the comments. State
v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985), overruled
on other grounds, State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986).
Erroneous inclusion of intent to defraud an
insurer in the information as comprising an
element of aggravated arson was harmless
error, where a correct instruction on the subject was later given to the jury immediately
before their deliberations, to which no objection was taken. State v. Bergwerff, 777 P 2d
510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Admission of defendant's prior offenses was
harmless error as there was no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result without the
admission of the prior bad acts evidence. State
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989).
Minor defect.
Conviction for fornication would not be reversed because information charged defendant
with having committed offense with one
"Verda," whereas her name was Beatea, where
identity of woman was sufficiently established
State v. Chipman, 40 Utah 549, 123 P. 89
(1912).
Substantial right affected.
Court could not reverse judgment unless
some substantial right of defendant had been
invaded. State v. Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 P
271 (1918).
The verdict of a jury will not be upset on
appeal merely because some error or irregularity may have occurred, but will be overturned
only if the error or irregularity is something
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different result.
State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982);
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State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989);
State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989).
Where preprinted form affidavit in support
of a search warrant was left blank concerning
the date of the informant's observations and
the date the information was given to the affiant, any defect in the affidavit caused by the
blanks was required to be disregarded where
the defendants did not contend the blanks in
any way infringed upon their substantial
rights. State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah
1983).
For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently
high to undermine confidence in the verdict.
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987);
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 198ft,
aiTd, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989), competency
evaluation found invalid and conviction vacated, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
Jury verdict would not be upset when there
was no indication that trial court's improper
action in reassigning the case without a written order of the court affected defendant's
rights. State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah
1988).
The Supreme Court's standard for dealing
with non-constitutional error is that the court
will not reverse a conviction unless the error is
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more favorable
result for the defendant. State v. Johnson, 771
P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989).
Admission of witness's hypnotically enhanced testimony was harmful error at defendant's trial for first-degree murder because,
without such testimony, there was a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have
been more favorable for defendant, i.e., he
might have been convicted of second degree
murder or some other lesser included offense.
State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989)
—State's burden of persuasion.
When the defendant can make a credible
agrument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense, it is up to the state to persuade the court that there is no reasonable
likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome
of trial would have been more favorable for the
defendant. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah
1987).
Defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery was reversed where the state failed to persuade the Supreme Court that the defense was
not prejudiced by the nondisclosure of inculpatory evidence and, absent the prosecutor's
errors, there was a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for defendant. State v.
Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987).

Rule 3 0

Variances.
There could not be said to be any legal variance between the proof and the allegation
when the allegation was immaterial, and
might be treated as surplusage. United States
v. Kershaw, 5 Utah 618, 19 P. 194 (1888).
On prosecution for stealing sheep, variance
between commitment which stated that sheep
were common property of 10 individuals, and
information which charged several ownership
of sheep in six of same individuals was not fatal, since it appeared from statements in commitment and those in information that each
was intended to charge the same offense —
same transaction. State v. McKee, 17 Utah
370, 53 P. 733 (1898).
In prosecution for forgery, there was no fatal
variance between allegation that bank defrauded was Commercial National Bank and
proof that corporate name of bank was Commercial National Bank of Salt Lake City. State
v. Brown, 39 Utah 140,115 P. 994,1913E Ann.
Cas. 1 (1911).
Where defendant was charged by information with eight counts of theft from a sole proprietorship but was convicted on evidence
showing that he had stolen funds from a pool of
unnamed third party investors who had entrusted their money to the proprietorship, his
conviction was reversed on the ground that
such variance clearly prejudiced him in the
preparation and conduct of his defense on the
merits. State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260 (Utah
1985).
Cited in State v Schaffer, 638 P 2d 1185
(Utah 1981); State v. Watts, 639 P 2d 158
(Utah 1981); State v. Casarez. 656 P 2d 1005
(Utah 1982); State v. Benson, 712 P 2d 256
(Utah 1985); State v. Kay, 717 P 2d 1294 (Utah
1986); State v. Wade, 725 P 2d 1316 (Utah
1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah
1986); State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185 (Utah
1986); State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987);
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988);
State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988);
State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1989);
State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459 OJtah
1989); State v. Pacheco, 778 P 2d 26 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126
(Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 784 P 2d 1135
(Utah 1989); State v. Cude. 7S4 P 2d 1197
(Utah 1989); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774
(Utah 1991); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Ontiveros, 835
P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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Rule 31. Rules of court.
(1) District courts may make local rules for the conduct of criminal proceedings not inconsistent with these rules and statutes of the state. Copies of all
rules made by a court shall, upon promulgation, be furnished to the Supreme
Court and to the Judicial Council and shall be made available to members of
the state bar and the public.
(2) If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed
in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or statutes.
(Amended effective November 1, 1996.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment added the subdivision designations and
deleted provisions for rules of circuit courts.

Cross-References. — Judicial Council,
Utah Const, Art. VIII, Sec. 12.
Utah State Bar, § 78-51-1 et seq.

Rule 32. Minute entry.
The case file shall include copies of all minute entries of proceedings and
orders made in that case.

Rule 33. Regulation of conduct in the courtroom.
The court may make appropriate orders regulating the conduct of officers,
parties, spectators and witnesses prior to and during the conduct of any proceeding.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state
criminal trial in order to preserve confidentiality of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156.
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170.

Exclusion of public from state criminal trial
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55
A.L.IUth 1196.
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DENNIS L. JUDD - 1762
RACHELLE LONDON PALMER - 6921
Daggett County Attorneys
Attorneys for State of Utah
461 West 200 South
Vernal, Utah 04070
Telephone: (001) 709-5359
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAGGETT STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

vs.

:

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

:

DAVID A. HINSON,

:
:

CASE NO. CR-276

Defendant.
THIS matter came before the Court for a pretrial conference
on June 6, 1997, with the Honorable John R. Anderson presiding.
The defendant appeared and was represented by D. Bruce Oliver. The
State was represented by Rachelle L. Palmer.
The Defendant appeared before the Justice Court Judge on or
about September 25, 1996 and plead guilty to his charges and then
filed his Notice of Appeal with the Justice Court on or about
October 10, 1996.

The State of Utah filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendant's Appeal which was still pending before the
court.

The District Court ruled that the Defendant was allowed a

trial de novo over the objections of the State of Utah that a trial

de novo was not appropriate since the Defendant had entered a
guilty plea and had not moved to withdraw that guilty plea.
The Court next addressed Defendant's Request for Discovery.
The request was submitted to the State on or about March 25, 1997.
The State had not sent a reply as of the date of the pretrial
conference.

No other efforts had been made by the Defendant to

obtain the response to discovery. The Defendant's attorney had not
called the County Attorney nor written a letter in order to obtain
a response to discovery.

The defendant made an oral motion to

dismiss the case based on the State's failure to provide discovery
in a timely manner at the pretrial conference. The Court dismissed
the case over objections from the State of Utah that the Motion was
not proper in that the time for answering discovery had not
expired.
WHEREFORE, the court orders the following:
1.

Defendant is granted a trial de novo as a result of his

appeal from Justice Court.

2

2.

This case is dismissed based on the State's failure to

provide discovery in a timely manner.
DATED this ^P\

day of

1 DM\S

X^Al997

rOHN R. ANDERSON
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:
D. Bruce Oliver
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,
a copy of the foregoing Order and Judgment to: D. Bruce Oliver,
Attorney for Defendant, 100 South 300 West, Suite 210, Salt Lake
City, Utah 04101-1210.
DATED t h i s

:vh

i

day of

\H

19 <TK
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m:\dagl4\dhlnoon.omj
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DENNIS L. JUDD - 17G2
RACHELLE LONDON PALMER - 6921
Daggett County Attorneys
Attorneys for State of Utah
461 West 200 South
Vernal, Utah 04070
Telephone: (001) 709-5359
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAGGETT STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

vs.

:

ORDER A11D JUDGMENT

:

CYNTHIA HINSON,

:
:

CASE NO. CR-277

Defendant.
THIS matter came before the Court for a pretrial conference
on June 6, 1997, with the Honorable John R. Anderson presiding.
The defendant appeared and was represented by D. Druce Oliver. The
State was represented by Rachelle L. Palmer.
The Defendant appeared before the Justice Court Judge on or
about September 25, 1996 and plead guilty to her charges and then
filed her Notice of Appeal with the Justice Court on or about
October 10, 1996.

The State of Utah filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendant's Appeal which was utill pending before the
court.

The District Court ruled that the Defendant was allowed a

trial de novo over the objections of the State of Utah that a trial

W

de novo was not appropriate since the Defendant had entered a
guilty plea and had not moved to withdraw that guilty plea.
The Court next addressed Defendant's Request for Discovery.
The request was submitted to the State on or about March 25, 1997.
The State had not sent a reply as of the date of the pretrial
conference.

No other efforts had been made by the Defendant to

obtain the response to discovery. The Defendant's attorney had not
called the County Attorney nor written a letter in order to obtain
a response to discovery.

The defendant made an oral motion to

dismiss the case based on the State's failure to provide discovery
in a timely manner at the pretrial conference. The Court dismissed
the case over objections from the State of Utah that the Motion was
not proper in that the time for answering discovery had not
expired.
WHEREFORE, the court orders the following:
1.

Defendant is granted a trial de novo as a result of her

appeal from Justice Court.

2

2.

This case is dismissed based on the State's failure to

provide discovery in a timely manner.

Approved as to Form:
D. Bruce Oliver
Attorney £or Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/ILAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,
a copy of: the foregoing Order and Judgment to: D. Bruce Oliver,
Attorney tor Defendant, IBO South 300 West, Suite 210, Salt Lake
City, Utah 04101-1210.
DATED this -\\[)

day of

.LiM

a: \dagl4\cliinooit.oaj

3
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY
STATE OF LAAH
-O0O-

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,

CASE NO.

CR-276
CR-277

VS.

MOTION TO DISMISS
HINSON,
DEFENDANTS.
HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON
-O0OBE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 6TH DAY OF JUNE, 1 9 9 7 ,
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION NOW PENDING IN THE ABOVE-NAMED
COURT, WAS HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN R. ANDERSON,
COMMENCING IN THE MORNING SESSION OF SAID DAY AT THE
DAGGETT COUNTY COURTHOUSE, MANILA, UTAH.
APPEARANCES
»?/"\T3

^>» -> — M r n - r *7*7

DEPUTY DAGGETT COUNTY ATTORNEY
4 6 1 WEST 2 0 0 SOUTH
VERNAL, UTAH 3 4 0 7 3

FOR DEFENDANT:

BRUCE OLIVER
1 8 0 SOUTH 3 0 0 V7EST,
.? -\ - -r»

COPY

"

"N V

"TV

T'

&210

THE COURT:
nana

c\jn.

ctxci.t^±t\ij

3
4

OKAY.

I HAVE HINSON AND HINSON SET

.

MR. OLIVER:

YOUR HONOR, BRUCE OLIVER APPEARING FOR

THE DEFENDANTS, HINSONS.

5

THE COURT:

IT LOOKS LIKE THIS IS AN APPEAL DE

7

POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA AND POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA.

8

THERE IS A SIMILAR THING WITH CYNTHIA HINSON.

9

FILED A MOTION OPPOSING YOUR APPEAL.

THE STATE HAS

I LOOKED AT THESE FILES.

10

I THINK THE APPEAL WAS TIMELY.

11

BEEN MORE APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER A MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE

12

PLEA, THERE WAS A PLEA, I THINK YOU ARE ENTITLED TO A TRIAL DE

13

NOVO, SO I GUESS THE APPEAL IS PROPER.

14

THAT Y3T, THAT WILL BE MY RULING.

16

RULED ON THAT, BUT I APPRECIATE THE COURT RULING ON THAT.

17

THE COURT:

AND EVEN THOUGH IT MAY HAVE

IF I HAVEN'T RULED ON

SO I GUESS WE NEED A TRIAL DATS.

AND

13

WE NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER THE CASES CAN BE JOINED OR TRIED

LJ

3Z7ATLATELI.

~j

CJL, rtTHER.E A?„E W E ?
vlTs..

^XJX^EXX:

JL IxiliUs.

11

W<U\JLJLJ

O i l .-ijcr-^w-r-rvju.-i^ Ji

SECONDLY, WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED

lw

21

THEM SEPARATELY.

22

DISCOVERY FROM THE STATE.

23

THERE'S BEEN NO OPPORTUNITY TO TALK OR TO NEGOTIATE AT ALL.

24

IT'S BEEN SOMEWHAT OF A WASTED TRIP FOR US.

25

SALT LAKE.

J.^1

YET. ANY

WE HAVE COME UP FOR PRETRIAL.

WE HAVE COME FROM

BOTH THE HINSCNS AND MYSELF HAVE COM3 FROM SALT

2

1

LAKE.

AND THERE'S BEEN -- DISCOVERY REQUEST WAS FILED ON

*

i.Urtjx\_xi ^ o x n

3

RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE ARRAIGNMENT.

4

WAS DATED MARCH 13TH - - O R MARCH 18TH, IF I AM NOT MISTAKEN,

5

AND SETTING THE ARRAIGNMENT DATE FOR MARCH 2 8TH.

C

*^TTT">

O

O U A *-i xr £" jijrxi"^-vj.<^_ iJj

7

DISCOVERY.

8

THE --

TV n n r i n n ^ ^ T / I T H

9
10

ox4

lnxo

i M n

JL&rtJX, *i£ijL\~£i
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NOTICE OF THE ARRAIGNMENT
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WE ENTERED
^

T-N I-» O r •* •-» <-> i—•
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c\jss.

AND, AS OF YET, WE HAVE RECEIVED NOTHING FROM

THE COURT:

HAVE YOU ASKED, CALLED THEM OR SENT

THEM A LETTER OR FOLLOWED UP AT ALL?

11

MR. OLIVER:

NO.

THERE'S BEEN NO FOLLOW-UP.

12

HAS NO REPORTS, EITHER.

13

THIS MORNING IF I CANNOT SEE THE REPORT.

14

ANYTHING IN HER £ 1LE EITHER.

16

WITH THE DISCOVERY.

17

PURPOSES.

13

HINSONS AND MYSELF.

SHE HAS NOTHING AT ALL.

SHE

I ASKED HER

SHE DOESN'T HAVE

SO, AT THIS POINT, YOUR HONOR,

AND WE ARE HERE FOR PRETRIAL FOR

IT'S JUST BEEN A WASTED TRIP FOR US, FOR BOTH

TliZ ZZ *J~?'7:

19

20

urtio

'TrJ?-..? -S

-VJUR REo7L-N3Z?

/LiERj. I J --~-i-

STUFF?

21

MS. PALMJER:

YOUR HONOR, WE TRIED TO OBTAIN THE

THERE'S BEEN SOMEWHAT OF CONFUSION ABOUT THIS CASE.

22

STUFF.

23

THERE WAS A GUILTY PLEA AND, THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS

24

SHOULD NOT BE TRIAL DE NOVO.

25

AND THAT THEY CAN OBJECT TO THE SENTENCING AMD NOT THE PLEA.

THEY ADMITTED TO THEIR GUILT,

3

ALSO --

3

MS. PALMER:

DISCOVERY IS SUPPOSED TO BE GIVEN IN A

4

TIMELY MANNER PRIOR TO TRIAL.

5

WILL BE PRIOR TO TRIAL.

6

r-x%v-/v-iJii-/vjiA.o,

7

TRIAL.

rtujjuH

r\-rr<. u o

8

MR. OLIVER:

9

THE COURT:

THERE IS NO TRIAL.

DISCOVERY

THE RULEf CRIMINAL RULES OF
iU

uiv£i
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ur* xw
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WELL, YOUR HONOR, ALSO -MOTION'S GRANTED.

YOU HAVE HAD THIS

10

REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY SINCE MARCH 25TH, AND I DON'T THINK

11

THAT'S APPROPRIATE.

12

MR. OLIVER:

13

THE COURT:

14

•vto

16

THE COURT:

17
18

21
22
23

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
OKAY.

ARE THERE ANY OTHER MATTERS WS

HEED TO DEAL WITH?

15

D^T.VPTJ.

or

T

rpjj"? 3SLI3VE SC.

OKAY.

WE'LL BE IN RECESS.

1
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
I, RUSSEL D. MORGAN, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

3

FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE

4

FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED

5

AT THE TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME

7

FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 2 THROUGH 4, INCLUSIVE; AND

8

THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION

9

OF TESTIMONY GIVEN.

10
11
12

TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS
8TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1997, AT VERNAL, UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH.

13
14
15
16

1-RUS3EL D. MORGAM, C3R

17
18
19
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:
2"!

22
23
24
25

\

